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find. As my legal friends would put it, “details that could
reasonably have been expected to appear in evidential
text were absent.”
Watson: So, heart disease remains an enigma—though
the striking rise and fall over the past 50 years is
strongly suggestive of a biological cause. No doubt
those who smoke or take insufficient exercise or whose
cholesterol concentrations are greatly raised may be at
“increased risk,” but none can be determinant (in the
way the putative biological cause clearly must be),
which is why the pattern of the disease has changed so
dramatically quite independently of them. I can hardly
wait to smell once again the aroma of a cooked break›
fast with an easy conscience.
Holmes: Watson, your wish will be granted, and I will
instruct Mrs Hudson accordingly. Meanwhile, given
everything we have learnt today—and how fascinating it
has been—we should perhaps usefully turn our attention
to investigating why your fellow doctors have been per›
suaded to prescribe cholesterol lowering drugs on so
massive a scale.21 22 But that is for another day.
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Are ethical principles relative to time and place?
A Star Wars perspective on the Alder Hey affair
Kim D Arcus, Anthony S Kessel
The problems at Alder Hey Hospital around how, when, and why parents’ consent should be
sought for research on their dead children’s tissues has raised some old philosophical questions.
In particular, to what degree can practices be morally defended on the grounds of context?
To help shed light on this, Kim D Arcus and Anthony S Kessel went to a different time and place
and requested help from a galaxy far, far away—from Dr Luke Skywalker and his mentor,
Obi›Wan Kenobi
Dr Luke Skywalker: Obi, I need some advice.
Obi›Wan Kenobi: Ahhh, you only see old Obi when
you need advice these days, huh?
Dr Luke: Obi, you know the Force is a delicate balance.
Now, let me explain my scenario. Occasionally organs
and tissues from babies and fetuses are retained after
postmortem examination for research and education.
Current practice is to obtain informed consent to
retain them, but 10 to 20 years ago this wasn’t
commonplace. Recently in England some of these
organs were kept at some pathology laboratories with›
out consent—such as at Alder Hey Hospital.1 2 Parents
feel they were misled into thinking that they were
burying their deceased children intact, whereas in fact
some organs and tissues were missing. From the
pathologists’ point of view, this old paternalistic
approach was warranted in the interest of avoiding
parental distress and generating benefit to society
through research and training. The way I see it, this is
a matter of context, and politicians and the media
have exaggerated the issue of consent out of
proportion. Paternalistic actions of yesteryear are
being judged by today’s ethical standards. Surely
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ethical principles change and are relative to time and
place?
Obi: Mmmm. You can look at this difficult problem
from several perspectives; the parents’ and patholo›
gists’ are just two. However, a look through the lenses of
moral philosophy and medical ethics may help to
untangle this conundrum. These disciplines are
concerned with, in the words of Socrates, “how we
ought to live, and why”—in other words, how we should
treat people and how we decide what is right or wrong.
For your scenario, I think an awareness of moral
relativism, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and biomedi›
cal ethics will help.
Dr Luke: OK, I’ll tell Princess Leia I’ll be late for
dinner—again!
Obi: So, let’s start with moral relativism which relates to
your argument about changes over time and place.
Moral relativism is about the nature of ethics and says
that ethical standards are contingent on history,
context, and culture.3 The famous Roman physician
Galen, for example, did most of his anatomy research
on pigs and dogs as it was regarded as immoral to dis›
sect humans at that time.4 But attitudes changed, and
by the 19th century the demand for human cadavers
was such that grave robbing became prevalent to sup›
ply medical schools in the United Kingdom with
necessary teaching resources.4
Dr Luke: So there you go—you’ve proved my point that
it all changes over time. Hence, you can’t use the
consent practices of today to judge actions 20 years
ago. Have we finished?
Obi: Well not quite. If we accept this relativism
idea wholly then it doesn’t easily allow criticism of
people’s actions that you and others may see as
immoral.3 For example, if we use a strong relativism
framework, Nazi experiments on humans during the
second world war could be interpreted as merely an
expression of a set of values and ethics from a different
time and place.
Dr Luke: But we all know those experiments were
wrong.
Obi: So, there’s the contradiction. Why are the Nazi
experiments deemed not relative to time and place and
yet the retention of organs without consent are
deemed relative?
Dr Luke: OK, so there must be some principles that
are more consistent over time and, well, some that
are not.
Obi: Well, philosophers have created many moral
theories that are more consistent over time and place.
For the purposes of this conundrum we’ll look at utili›
tarianism, a theory based on consequences, and
Kantianism, a theory based on duty or deontology.
Dr Luke: Consequences? Deontology?
Obi: Yes, such as weighing up the expected pleasure
and enlightenment you gain from talking to me
against the pleasure and enlightenment you gain from
time with Princess Leia—that’s utilitarianism. Com›
pare that to an intrinsic duty to, say, be on time for
dinner, regardless of the consequences—that’s Kan›
tianism. Let me explain further. Utilitarians, in the tra›
dition of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill,5
believe that actions are morally good if, on balance,
they bring the most happiness—commonly referred to
as the greatest good for the greater number.6
Physicians may claim, on utilitarian grounds, that ben›
efits from research that has helped to reduce mortality
and increase scientific understanding are greater than
the negative impacts, such as parents’ anguish at hav›
ing to consider giving consent at such a difficult time.2
Some have even questioned why those refusing to take
part in such research should gain from those who
have.7
Dr Luke: But forcing everyone to take part in research
would bring substantial pain and distress for some
people. Body states after death, for example, are very
important to some Hindus and Buddhists owing to
their possible impact on reincarnation.8
Obi: Exactly, and those are some of the criticisms of
utilitarianism—firstly, that it’s difficult to measure accu›
rately happiness or pain, and, secondly, that it can
defend acts that most people take to be unjust, such as
forced participation in research or even genocide.
Dr Luke: But . . . Kantian ethics?
Obi: Kant’s philosophy is based on duty rather than
consequences—such as always telling Princess Leia the
truth rather than weighing up the impacts of being
honest or lying to her—as a means to determining what
to do. Kant argued there was a categorical imperative
to “treat people as ends in themselves, never merely as
means to an end.”9 In not being asked for consent,Let the ethics be with you
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“There must be some principles that are
more consistent over time.”
“Utilitarianism can defend acts that
most people take to be unjust.”
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parents could argue that their children were effectively
being used as a means to research and not as ends in
themselves.
Dr Luke: But, under Kant, as long as the intentions of
my actions are within my duties then it doesn’t matter
what the consequences are. So, wasn’t retaining those
organs part of the clinicians’ moral duty to society to
further science and reduce mortality? Surely their
actions were morally justified—it’s just that some of the
consequences weren’t so good.
Obi: Yes, and that’s a criticism of Kantian theories. A
lack of consideration for the consequences of actions.
Dr Luke: OK, let me get this straight. Strong relativism,
in an extreme individualistic form, can almost lead to a
sense of anarchy. So we looked for some universality in
utilitarianism and Kantianism. But I’ve still got parents
on one side and clinicians on the other and no
universality—at least over time.
Obi: OK, I didn’t say this was going to be easy. Let’s see
what medical ethics thinks of all this. Beauchamp and
Childress identified four principles that were designed
to cut across some of the problems posed by relativism
while paying heed to the importance of context.10
Dr Luke: So what are these four principles?
Obi: Respect for autonomy, non›maleficence, benefi›
cence, and justice. In a way these four principles derive
both from deontological theories, such as Kantian
ethics, and from consequentialist theories, such as
utilitarianism. Non›maleficence and beneficence have
utilitarian overtones. Recall your Hippocratic Oath to
“do no harm.” Some pathologists thought they might
cause undue harm (maleficence) by requesting
consent especially after a tragic young death. But by
retaining the organs they would do social good
(beneficence).
Dr Luke: But now comes the Kantian bit, right?
Obi: Yes, in Kantian terms, respect for autonomy is
closely related to the categorical imperative of treating
people as ends and not means.11 Without respecting
informed consent, people’s ability to make their own
decisions (to “self determine”) is taken away.
Dr Luke: So if we are to be utilitarian and Kantian at
the same time, surely conflicts must arise?
Obi: Quite right, and therein lies the difficulty. As
Lindblom says, we need to incrementally “muddle
through” in our decisions.12 We need to be aware of
these underlying principles and continually monitor
how they are being exhibited in practice. Guidance is
available from the Royal College of Pathologists and
the Nuffield Council, as well as from international
mandates such as the Nuremberg Code and the Dec›
laration of Helsinki.13–16 They all emphasise the
importance of respect for people’s autonomy. The
Declaration of Helsinki, for example, states that “con›
siderations related to the well›being of the human
subject should always take precedence over the inter›
ests of science and society.”16
Dr Luke: So if this maxim of respecting someone’s
autonomy is universal then we should have been
asking for consent then?
Obi: If you subscribe to the principles of biomedical
ethics then yes, as the principle of autonomy was not
sufficiently addressed. However, these principles of
medical ethics are not without their critics.17 But look
around you, Luke. With the rise in human rights,
respect for autonomy is a principle being applied
more explicitly.18 The key is to continue to be aware of
the history and context in which debates arise and
their relation to the ethical norms of the day. And
watch out for exaggerations based on personal or
political interests—what the pathologists did cannot be
compared with the atrocities that Darth Vader is
inflicting on our fellows! Engage in debate with your
colleagues, and regularly review codes of conduct and
guidelines, especially as you fast approach more
abstract issues relating to DNA and genomics.19
Remember, Luke, when I say “let the Force be with
you,” I’m talking about the bond and energy between
you and your patients. Use the Force, Dr Luke.
Together, patient and clinician, you can help improve
the health of our galaxy.
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